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Abstract
Intel's FAB 17 (F 17), in an effort to remain competitive and reduce production cycle
time, recently committed to adopt lean manufacturing as their approach to continuous
improvement. To aid in this effort, the factory staff has dedicated a group people to
develop tools based on lean manufacturing principles. Over the last 18 months, they have
created three systematic approaches to address various forms of throughput variation,
Autonomous Manufacturing (AM), Planned Maintenance (PM), and Waste Elimination
(WE). Autonomous Manufacturing focuses on refurbishing manufacturing tools to new
or better condition, up-skilling manufacturing technicians, and differentiating abnormal
from normal operating conditions. It is meant to address throughput variation as a direct
result of old, poorly maintained tools. Planned Maintenance focuses on keeping
refurbished tools in new or better conditions, level loading maintenance activities, and
minimizing manufacturing tool downtime due to scheduled maintenance activities. It is
meant to address throughput variation as a direct result of tool availability variation.
Finally, Waste Elimination focuses on optimizing the flow of information, people, and
material. It is meant to address throughput variation as a direct result of inefficient flow
through the manufacturing process.
This thesis provides an overview of F17's lean journey. It shows that F17 has done an
excellent job of developing an infrastructure to support their lean transformation. Going
forward, their major challenge will be ingraining the new principles into the existing
organizational structure. A variation analysis approach uses a simple model of daily
production of an operation, several key metrics that relate work in progress (WIP) flow to
tool performance, and a graphical display of WIP flow and tool performance. A case
study conducted identifies the most probable source of throughput variation as arrivals at
one operation, tool performance at another operation, and WIP management at a third
operation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter provides background on Intel Corporation, the motivation for the internship,
an overview of the issues the internship is intended to address, and an outline for the
remainder of the thesis.
1.1 Intel Corporation
Founded in 1968, Intel Corporation (INTegrated ELectronics), sought to design, develop,
and manufacture cutting edge semiconductor based electronic components. While
initially focusing on memory products, Intel has built up significant brand recognition
and customer loyalty by continuously providing the market with leading edge
microprocessors, such as the Pentium and Centrino product lines. The first to market
with new technology strategy has provided Intel with significant competitive advantage
and has driven up customer's willingness to pay for these products. Each new
technology generation reduces feature dimensions by 0.7 times, increases transistor
density by 2.0 times, and increases switching speed by 1.5 times, all of which increases
processor performance, reduces power consumption, and reduces manufacturing cost by
reducing area per die. Figure 1 (F 17 Comm. Dept., 2003) shows the typical technology
ramp pattern for microprocessors and chipsets. (Chipsets are integrated circuits that
perform one or more related functions to support a computer's microprocessor.)
250nm 180nm 130nm 90nm 65nm
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Figure 1: Technology Ramp Cycle
The first peak in the cycle represents microprocessor volumes. The second peak in
the cycle occurs as chipset volumes transfer from one technology to the next.
Note: This graphic is for illustration purposes only; peak sizes are not to scale.
4.5
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New process technology is closely related to new equipment. Every 10 to 12 years a new
wafer size, i.e. 200mm, is introduced. The introduction of a new wafer size also
accompanies the ramp of a new process technology. In 2003, Intel launched 90nm
process technology and made the decision to only run this technology on 300mm wafer
processing equipment. The combination of new process and equipment technology
positions Intel to provide the market with leading edge technology.
As mentioned above, Intel competes externally through its first to market strategy by
launching new process technology approximately every two years. Internally, the 11
fabrication facilities (fabs) worldwide compete to receive production volume, new
products, new process technology and new processing equipment. They compete on
metrics such as cost, quality, yield, and productivity to name a few. Those fabs that excel
in all areas are rewarded with increased production volume or wafer starts per week. If
they continue to be successful they are granted new products, new process technology
and eventually new processing equipment. The latest source for major inter-fab
competition has been for 300mm wafer process technology. Converting a 200mm fab to
a 300mm fab requires an investment in excess of a billion dollars and guarantees the long
term viability of the manufacturing site. If a 200mm fab is not placed on the roadmap for
300mm, it is at a distinct productivity disadvantage and will be at risk for shutdown
(Fearing, 2006).
1.2 Internship Motivation
During the summer of 2003, F 17 sought about developing a new manufacturing strategy
that would allow them to be successful without the productivity and technology advances
provided by new tooling or significant capital expenditures. The factory staff settled on
implementing the methods of continuous improvement developed by Toyota, popularly
known as lean manufacturing, and branded manufacturing eXcellence (mX) by Intel. To
assess and provide feedback to their progress, F 17 sponsored an internship with the
Leaders for Manufacturing Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In doing
so, they hoped to achieve the following goals:
* To understand the successes and the future opportunities for improving the
current implementation effort;
* And, to establish a structured approach to improving operational flow in an
area;
1.3 Problem Statement
F 17's wishes to transform the way their employees engage in continuous improvement
activities. To aid this effort, this internship seeks to address the following problems.
* Every employee needs to be involved in continuous improvement activities
* mX will be the method used by managers and technicians to achieve
successful continuous improvement throughout the site
* The change from current management practices to those advocated by mX
will be a long term organizational change and will occur in stages
* Implementation sustainability is of utmost concern
* Variability in WIP arrivals, tool performance, and personnel capacity to utilize
tools contribute to throughput variation. Current area performance metrics do
not reliably identify the source of throughput variation
1.4 Thesis Overview
The following will describe the content of the remainder of this thesis.
Chapter 2 provides a history of F17, a look at the markets F17 competes in, and builds
the business case for pursuing lean manufacturing.
Chapter 3 explains the existing organizational structure and outlines how the mX
structure has been developed.
Chapter 4 describes the tools developed by the mX group for use in improving tool
performance or operational flow in an area.
Chapter 5 outlines the variation analysis tool developed to assist in prioritizing
organizational effort. Three examples display the application of the tool in identifying
the most applicable improvement activity for a given area.
Chapter 6 reviews the findings and provides additional recommendations for F 17 in
focusing organizational effort and leading the organizational change.
Chapter 2: A Brief History of FAB 17
This chapter will review F17's history as a high volume manufacturing site, the
competitive markets in which F 17 competes, and the business case for engaging in a lean
manufacturing strategy.
2.1 Intel and F17
F 17, located in Hudson, Massachusetts, started as Digital Equipment Corporation's
(DEC) Hudson Manufacturing Facility. The site, originally developed in 1977, was built
into the modem semiconductor manufacturing facility it is today in 1995. From 1995
through to 1997, the Hudson site manufactured microprocessors for use in the computers
built by DEC. In 1997, Intel announced the purchase of DEC's semiconductor operations
and integrated the Hudson site as F17 (F17 Comm. Dept., 2003).
From 1998 until 2003, F17 stayed on the cutting edge of Intel technology eventually
receiving 130nm process technology. Since then, production volume has slowly
transferred from the high revenue microprocessors to the commoditized chipsets that
support them. By 2005, 20% of F17's production volume consisted of microprocessors
with the remaining 80% made up of chipsets. During the summer of 2005, Intel
announced a $250M investment in F 17 to support a 50% increase in chipset production
volume. By the end of 2006, nearly 95% of Fl7's production volume will be made up of
chipsets.
2.2 Chipset Market Overview
Intel's primary product is microprocessors in which they enjoy a market share in excess
of 80% (Shankland, 2005). Microprocessors, the central brain of a computer, are
typically the most costly component. Chipsets, on the other hand, are the semiconductor
based chips that act as a computers "nervous system" (Intel Annual Report, 2004) and
provide processor interface with the outside world. They effectively translate the signals
supplied by I/O devices to the processor to provide the core-logic interface functions
between the microprocessor and the rest of the system.
The first chipsets were developed to offload memory functions carried internally on
microprocessors. The offloading of these memory functions allowed for increased
processor speed. Chipsets were used because they could be positioned closer to the
processor and responded several orders of magnitude faster than hard drives, the only
other option for memory storage. Chipset functionality slowly expanded beyond simple
off processor memory storage to include graphics, user interface devices like keyboards,
and other high speed interface functions. Today, chipsets manufacturers seek to exploit
advances in processor technology and thereby improve customer experience at the user
interface by enhancing chipset functionality (Kissel, 2005).
Process technology for chipsets generally lags that of processors by several years. This
results in lower barriers to entry, because older and therefore fully depreciated, process
equipment can be used for manufacturing. For example, leading edge microprocessors
are currently manufactured by Intel in high volume using 90nm technology. Chipsets are
still manufactured at several sites using 350nm technology, a process that is 4 generations
behind that of processors (Intel Annual Report, 2004). To protect their market position in
chipsets, Intel aggressively protects their processor/chipset interface designs through the
patent process. This action forces competitors, seeking to supply chipsets to support Intel
processors, to license the interface designs from Intel. The results are significant
advantage in time to market and performance of Intel chipsets versus their competitors
and 64.5% share of the market. In spite of Intel's aggressive strategies, competition
remains fierce as demonstrated by the 4.2% decline in average chipset price to $21.87 by
the end of 2004 (Rau, 2005).
2.3 For What Purpose? - The Business Case for Lean
In making the decision to pursue a lean manufacturing strategy, businesses develop a case
that provides an overarching motivation for the strategic shift. Typically the business
case culminates around competition and customer responsiveness and their effects on
cost structure. Intel as a corporation does not have broad support to implement lean on a
corporate level. This is due to the business case. For most of Intel's manufacturing
facilities, especially those on the 300mm road map, they manufacture differentiated
products, specifically microprocessors. Consumers purchase computers based on
microprocessor performance and are willing to pay a premium for leading edge products.
Intel's first to market strategy perfectly aligns with the needs of the market and allows
them to set the price for their products using the price equation:
Price = Cost + Profit Margin.
Here, profit margin is controlled to maintain profits. While manufacturing costs for high
revenue products matter, they are insignificant to other metrics such as yield and
productivity or more importantly, process technology time to market.
Chipsets, contrary to microprocessors, are less of a differentiated product. They have
slower product development cycles and less differentiation among competitors.
Customers do not purchase computers based on the type of chipsets. This results in
customers with a much lower willingness to pay and shifts the economics of the market.
In this new market the profit equation is:
Profit Margin = Price (fixed or falling) - Cost
As mentioned above in section 2.4, prices in the chipset market fell between 2003 and
2004 by 4.2%. Thus the key to profitability is Cost Reduction (Dennis, 2002). And the
only source of competitive advantage is the rate of continuous improvement of cost
structure. For Intel this translates into reducing cycle time as a main cost driver. To
illustrate this point, consider Intel's 2003 and 2004 raw materials, work in progress, and
finished goods inventory levels, shown below in Figure 2. Clearly, the large majority of
Intel's inventory investments are contained in WIP, with nearly 85% of total inventory
held in WIP and finished goods. This leaves Intel with a large quantity of product with
high holding costs and at high risk for obsolescence (Intel considers all product with
excess demand within a rolling six month horizon to be valueless)(Intel Annual Report,
2004).
2004 Inventory 2003 Inventory
Raw materials 388 15% 333 13%
Work in process 1,418 54% 1,490 59%
Finished goods 815 31% 696 28%
Total $2,621 100% $2,519 100%
Figure 2: Intel Inventory Levels for 2003 and 2004.
The decision not to convert from 200mm to 300mm has not affected the short term
viability of F 17. Since the decision, production volume has been shifted from
microprocessors to chipsets. As mentioned earlier, Intel recently rewarded F 17's
performance since 2003 by investing $250M in additional 200mm process equipment and
increasing their production volume by 50%. While these short term successes are
encouraging, the increased investment and production volume do nothing to establish F 17
as a high volume manufacturing site with long term viability. To address this short fall,
the factory staff decided to take proactive action and pursue a lean manufacturing
strategy in 2004. This decision was made for one main reason: Building an
organizational capacity to continuously improve will become F17's source of competitive
advantage. Since then, members of the factory staff along with a dedicated mX
implementation team set about developing the tactics to achieve the new mX strategy.
(In millions)
Chapter 3: mX at F17
This chapter reviews F 17's Plant and Manufacturing organizational structure. It will also
discuss the method used to develop an organizational infrastructure to support the mX
initiative.
3.1 F17 Organization
F 17 processes 200mm wafers in lot boxes of 25 wafers, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
The Plant Manager carries overall responsibility for day to day operations of the fab.
Reporting directly to the Plant Manager is the factory staff. The factory staff consists of
Department Managers for Manufacturing (Mfg), Special Projects, Process Engineering
(PE), Yield and Sort, and Manufacturing Systems Engineering (MSE) as well as various
other support functions such as Finance and Human Relations. Group Leaders, or Shift
Managers in the case of Manufacturing, report to each Department Manager. The Group
Leaders are responsible for managing salary direct reports. In manufacturing, Shift
Managers manage Operations Managers. Operations Managers are the front line
managers that coordinate the tactical production and maintenance operations on a day to
day basis. In process engineering, Group Leaders manage functional area Process
Engineers. Process Engineers are responsible for internal "recipes" that the technician
and/or tools use to process wafers through an operation. Figure 3 below provides a basic
outline of the organizational structure. Note: This chart is intended as an example and is
incomplete.
Figure 3: F17 Organizational Chart
In addition to this structure of direct reports, there are other organizational structures used
to provide cross functional support where needed. One example is the Functional Area
Coordination Meeting (FACM) structure. This meeting consists of Manufacturing
Manager, Shift Manager, assigned process engineers and engineering group leaders.
Reporting to the FACM is the Group Leader Operations Manager (GLOM) forum.
GLOM's consist of Group Leaders across several functional areas, the responsible
Operations Managers that tactically manage those functional areas, and an assigned Shift
Manager with expertise in the area. Reporting to the GLOM is the Module Team (MOD
Team). The MOD Team consists of aligned Process Engineers, an Operations Manager,
and Manufacturing Technician representatives from all 4 manufacturing shifts. Members
of these teams typically work on issues that effect WIP flow, manufacturing tool
performance, and overall area operations. Figure 4 below outlines the FACM - GLOM -
MOD Team Structure.
Figure 4: FACM Organizational Structure
The FACM structure is an excellent example of how Intel seeks to provide an
infrastructure to support factory wide initiatives with cross functional support.
3.2 mX Infrastructure Development
In early 2004, following the decision by Intel to keep F17 off the 300mm roadmap, the
factory staff began to discuss the future of F17. Several engineers in the organization,
with experience in Total Productive Maintenance, recommended experimenting with
techniques of lean manufacturing. Those engineers planned and executed a learning lab
with 10 people that ranged from front line technicians to members of the factory staff.
The Learning Lab convinced members of the factory staff that lean manufacturing/mX
was the path F 17 should take to insure long term viability.
Following the Learning Lab, an mX steering committee and dedicated mX
Implementation Team was formed. The newly formed Implementation Team, through
low cost experimentation entitled the Management Model, began development of a
structured approach to improving area performance. They started with work place
organization efforts in three functional areas of the factory. The effort had several goals.
First, the Implementation Team wanted to understand the dynamics of operating a team
consisting of shift managers, operations managers, and members of factory staff all
physically working along side manufacturing technicians as peers. Second, they wanted
to develop a robust, structured approach that area managers could easily use in other
areas of the factory.
Following the Management Model, the Implementation Team moved into Wave 2. Wave
2 expanded the learning captured in the Management Model and launched the first pilot
manufacturing equipment improvement and maintenance level loading experiments.
Wave 2 also had several goals. First, the Implementation Team wanted to expand front
line management understanding of the mX initiative while adapting key learning from the
management model. Second, they wanted to develop a robust, structured approach to
improving tools to new or better condition, upskilling the workforce in the operation of
the tools, and developing inspection criteria that clearly defines normal from abnormal
operating conditions. Finally, they wanted to develop an understanding of how quick
change over and planned maintenance level loading activities could decrease tool
downtime for planned and unplanned maintenance.
3.3 mX Organizational Structure
One outcome from the significant work done by the Implementation Team was the
development of the mX Organization. In terms of direct reports, the mX group reports to
the Special Projects Department Manager, see Figure 3, and consists of a group leader
and 4 to 6 Implementation Team Members. Functionally, the mX group provides an
interface between the mX Steering Committee and the manufacturing organization. Each
member of the Implementation Team is responsible for leading implementation efforts
for at least two functional areas in the factory. Their role to date has been to deliver
training on mX philosophies and drive implementation activities across all 4
manufacturing shifts. Figure 5 below shows the functional mX organizational structure.
ml X Steering Committeer
I
aX Implementation Team
Litho mX Team Litho 2 mX Team e Etch 1 mX Team Thin Films I mX Team
Operations Managers
- Process Engineers
t Manufacturing Techniciansrb
- Align Shift/Department Managers
lmX Implementation Team Member
Figure 5: mX Organizational Structure
Using a separate organization has allowed F7 to develop and role model how managers
and frontline technicians should engage in continuous improvement activities. The next
challenge is transferring the learning captured through the mX implementation
experience to the broader organization.
3.4 Implementation Model
The model that F 17 has adopted to implement Lean Manufacturing is based on Toyota's
initial work with Total Productive Maintenance (TPM). As with Toyota, F 17 postulated
that equipment variation was the main source of manufacturing process stability. To
address this concern and explore how a "lean" semiconductor Fab would look, the factory
staff coupled with several key contributors educated in TPM began to apply the
implementation framework they are using today.
The framework used at F 17 focuses around two core points. First, the best lessons are
self-concluded through learning by doing. And second, engage the problem at the point
of activity with the people who are the experts in the process, the frontline workers. To
capture the learning as each new activity occurs, they structured and reflect on their
activities as they are completed. They then seek to replicate the successful actions and
improve the areas that fell short of the mark. Figure 6 below shows the author's
representation of this cycle graphically.
Identified Improvement
OpportunitiesI
mX Group
Training Content Development Team Leadership Personnel Development
Low Cost Experimentation Delivery of Training Content
Evaluate Future Training Needs Lead Weekly Activities\ /
Directly Observe
Improvement Work
Figure 6: Implementation Framework.
The core of the framework lies in the engagement of an mX team member at the point of
activity with key stakeholders in the area. Their role in the implementation is three fold.
First, through low cost experimentation, develop the training content to grow
organizational knowledge of the lean effort, its philosophies, and its tools. Second, lead
the implementation effort at the ground level providing the initial momentum to get the
implementation going. And finally, professionally develop the key stakeholders in the
areas such that the implementation becomes self-sustaining.
From this effort, F 17 hopes to develop a unique organizational capability to organically
learn from and improve its operational environment. When successful, this capability
will be exceptionally difficult to duplicate, thus providing F 17 with a resource for longer
term viability.
Chapter 4: Lean "Tools"
Since early 2003, F17's mX group has experimented with and developed several
systematic approaches, referred to commonly as Lean Tools, for improving specific
problems within an area. These approaches are Autonomous Manufacturing, Planned
Maintenance, and Waste Elimination. This chapter discusses why these Tools have been
developed and what problem they are intended to solve.
4.1 Autonomous Manufacturing
Early in the development of mX at F17, the question was asked, what is the cause of our
long process cycle time. The answer: the variation in tool performance. This conclusion
was drawn based on some loose analysis and the direct experience on the shop floor. To
quantify this judgment, management points to the fact that, in the current state, more than
50% of maintenance activities at F 17 is breakdown, or unscheduled, maintenance.
Unscheduled maintenance is a problem for two reasons. First, it reduces average daily
capacity. Second, tools may breakdown during the processing of WIP and can cause
defects which lead to rework and scrap. In the ideal state, breakdown maintenance would
make up 0% of the maintenance time expended. Autonomous Manufacturing (AM) was
developed to structure the activity of eliminating unscheduled down time. The structured
activity provides a process for identifying factors that contribute to tool failures as well as
a mechanism for eliminating them (Koch, 2003).
The contributing factors that lead to tool failures are identified through a series of
increasingly intrusive inspections. The inspections start with the exterior portion of the
tool and get progressively deeper with each pass. The scope of each pass is defined by a
cross functional team consisting of those responsible for the area's performance to
include operations managers, process engineers, manufacturing technicians, and
potentially shift managers and group leaders from across each shift. To provide a
mechanism for resolving the defects, a series of facilitated and independent
technician/manager/engineer meetings were developed. Following the inspection of the
tool, these shift teams developed temporary solutions to the problem. After the defects
are corrected, the teams decide whether a root cause analysis is required to understand the
source of the defect. Once root cause is discovered by the team, countermeasures are
proposed to resolve the issue. The proposed countermeasures are presented to members
of the original four shift team and an implementation plan is developed. Several weeks
after implementation, members of the team follow up on the countermeasure to check if it
resolved the issue. If the countermeasure failed to resolve the defect, the process is
repeated until an effective countermeasure is developed. Successful countermeasures are
then standardized across all shifts.
Through this process, the technician and engineers responsible for the operating condition
of the tool, improve the tool's performance. By structuring the activity of refurbishing
the tool to new or better condition, the team is expected to identify critical inspection
points and operation standards that may not be in place or are not clearly understood. By
involving all technicians across all four shifts, process engineers, and operations
managers in the process, high agreement on the difference between normal and abnormal
operating conditions can be developed. Increased skill levels will also be recognized as
the team understands how to maintain the material condition of each tool.
The intent of AM is to increase the average capacity of a tool by eliminating unscheduled
downtime events. Figure 7 shows a possible capacity profile of a generic manufacturing
tool. As shown, daily tool capacity will have an average and standard distribution of
capacity.
I
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Capacity in Lots Per Day
Figure 7: Tool Capacity Probability Distribution
This figure shows the intended impact of AM activities on a tool.
.. 
... ....
In addition to increasing average capacity a secondary effect of increased mean time to
failure should also be observed. Assuming that the arrival rate to an operation does not
significantly change, the combination of increasing capacity and mean time to failure will
reduce throughput variation (Gershwin, 1994).
4.2 Planned Maintenance
Planned Maintenance has been developed to drive tool maintenance to the ideal state
where restored tools stay in new or better condition, capacity does not vary due to
maintenance activities, and total scheduled downtime is minimized. To achieve this ideal
state, teams, similar to those used in AM, use activities such as level loading, quick
change over procedures for maintenance actions, and coordination of maintenance
activities across manufacturing tools to minimize the impact on system throughput.
Additionally, failure mode analysis may be used to identify and eliminate failure modes
not addressed during the first AM activities (Koch, 2003).
The intent of PM activity is to narrow the daily distribution of capacity by decreasing
unplanned down time and the variation in planned maintenance. Level loading planned
maintenance, the act of breaking down large infrequent maintenance activities into
smaller more frequent chunks, will be used to illustrate how this occurs. Assume that a
given annual maintenance action requires 26 hours. This may be easiest for the
technician as it clumps maintenance activity into a single block of time; however it
increases capacity variation due to long repair down states which in turn increases line
variability (Gershwin, 1994). Less line variation will occur if the maintenance action can
be broken down to 30 minutes every week. Figure 8 shows how PM activity in an area
intends to affect an area's performance.
I
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Lots Per Day
Figure 8: Arrival and Capacity Probability Distributions
The first curve is an assumed probability distribution of WIP arrivals at a given
operation. The second curve is a probability distribution of tool Capacity. If the two
distributions overlap, then there is a non-zero probability that on any given day WIP
arrivals will exceed the available capacity to process that WIP. This non-zero probability
will tend to increase throughput variability and increase total product cycle time. By
decreasing the variation in planned maintenance, the daily distribution of capacity is
narrowed and the probability of arriving WIP experiencing a blocked state is decreased.
4.3 Waste Elimination
Contrary to PM and AM, Waste Elimination (WE) looks to improve the flow of
information, material, and people (Koch, 2003). This is done through a repetitive
process: Waste Identification; Definition of Current and Ideal State; Set Goal, Scope,
and Boundary Conditions; Problem Analysis and Countermeasure Development;
Implementation and Confirmation; Recurrence Prevention; Horizontal Replication.
Based on Plan-Do-Check-Act (Shiba & Walden, 2001), this process will engage the
workforce in continuous improvement at the point of activity with the process experts.
The intent of WE is to increase the workforce's capacity to do work, smooth WIP flow
through an area, and optimize WIP flow from area to area. Figure 9 shows a graphical
representation of the type of affect that WE can have on a work area.
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Figure 9: Arrival, Capacity, and Technician Capability Probability Distributions
Here the first curve is the probability distribution for WIP arrivals at an operation. The
second curve is the probability distribution of technician capability to process these WIP
Arrivals. The third curve is the probability distribution of equipment capacity to process
the WIP arrivals. Using this model, the available capacity of an area will correspond to
the smaller of people capability and equipment capacity. (Note: Measurement of people
capability to conduct work in an area cannot be accomplished using remote metrics.
Understanding the people component of work requires direct observation of the work
environment.) As shown, WE intends to increase the average and narrow the standard
deviation of technicians capacity to work by systematically identifying and eliminating
waste in daily processes. WE can also be used to increase the capacity of equipment by
eliminating or minimizing activities that result in lost capacity at a given tool.
4.4 Conclusions
The previous sections describe various approaches to improving the performance of an
area. Autonomous Manufacturing improves tool operation by refurbishing tools to new
or better conditions while increasing operator skill level in recognizing normal from
abnormal operating conditions. This approach effectively eliminates unscheduled
downtime and increases the mean time to failure. Planned Maintenance improves the
performance of the maintenance system and keeps refurbished tools in the restored
condition. By understanding new failure mechanisms, level loading maintenance
activities, and working on quick changeover procedures, the variation of tool capacity is
minimized. Waste Elimination focuses on the flow of information, material, and people
in an area. By using structured on shift problem solving, inefficiencies can be identified
and eliminated, thus increasing the capability of the entire area. The only unanswered
question is, what should an area work on first?
Chapter 5: Variation Analysis
This chapter discusses current area performance measures used at F 17 and proposes an
analysis approach to identify throughput variation that will allow area managers and
technicians to focus improvement efforts on the source of throughput variation.
5.1 Existing Metrics and Prioritization Methods
Intel and F 17 use a variety of ways to understand equipment and area performance. This
information is then used to prioritize the type of improvement work an area should
undertake. Figure 10 below describes the indicators, their units of measure, benefits, and
drawbacks.
Required Equipment Performance Indicators
Description Benefits Drawbacks
Availability Required - Minimum
availability required to meet factory Not normalized, theoretical calculation
loadings and line pace goals on a Easily communicated based on average WIP flows, does not
Areq weekly basis requirement, Easy to understand take variability of arrivals in to account.
Difference between the 80th percentile Not normalized, need to understand
of availability and minimum average Easily communicated measure of probability to understand metric, based
required availability over specified performance, takes tool on past performance, does not predict
A80-Areq timeframe variability into account future performance
Not normalized, provides binary
Outs/System/Week - Wafer outs Easily collected, easy to information did an area make their outs
target by each tool per week (168 communicate measure of (Y/N), based on past performance, does
CSWreq hrs), set by F17 performance not predict future performance
Time required to process raw material Based on past performance, can vary
into finished goods, typically Easy to communicate widely from period to period based on
Cycle Time expressed in terms of WIP Turns requirement, Easy to understand WIP volume variation in an area
Figure 10: F17 Required Equipment Performance Indicators
(Note: The term "Not Normalized" above means that the metric from one tool area cannot be directly
compared to another)
Required equipment performance indicators are compared to Model of Record (MOR)
metrics. The Model of Record provides availability, utilization, A80 and OSW
requirements based on theoretical calculations of throughput at a specified load level.
For example, the Model of Record for tool type Z may require 5 tools with an average
availability of 80% and utilization of 75% to meet the capacity requirements of a 5000
Wafer Starts Per Week (WSPW). In this case, each tool, with an average availability of
80% and utilization of 75% has a capacity of 1000 wafers per week. The Model of
Record can also be adjusted to better match actual capacity conditions. For example, at a
factory load level of 5000 WSPW, tool Z actually has 7 tools in the factory. To meet the
capacity requirement, the MOR can be reduced to an average availability of 60% and
utilization of 55% to better match the actual requirement. Figure 11 explains Model of
Record metrics.
Model of Record Equipment Performance Indicators
Description Benefits Drawbacks
Not normalized, single static number
based on theoretical calculations,
Virtual Factory (VF) collaboration that provides binary information, did the
sets tool availability target on the Easily communicated area's tools perform to the model
Availability basis of demonstrated capability requirement, Easy to understand specifications (Y/N)
VF collaboration that sets tool Not normalized, based on theoretical
utilization target on the basis of Easily communicated measure calculation, accuracy is questionable with
minimurn requirements to meet WIP of performance, can drive increased product mix, actual utilization
Utilization Turn goals? desired behaviors may vary based on availability of WIP
Not normalized, need to understand
80' h percentile of availability spanning Easily communicated measure of probability to understand metric, based
a 7 day timeframe or 28 day performance, takes tool on past performance, does not predict
A80 timeframe variability into account future performance
Not normalized, provides binary
Wafer outs target by each tool per information did an area make their outs
week (168 hrs), set by VF Easy to communicate (Y/N), based on past performance, does
OSW collaboration requirement, Easy to understand not predict future performance
Figure 11: Model of Record Equipment Performance Indicators
Performance improvement requirements are prioritized in several ways: predicted
capacity shortfalls base on the Model of Record, actual equipment performance compared
to the Model of Record and tools with an unacceptably low A80 as identified by A80-
Areq. All of these methods of prioritizing improvement efforts focus on equipment
performance. This implicitly assumes that the static models correctly reflect the dynamic
reality of the production floor.
To prioritize the mX implementation effort, the mX Steering Committee used A80-Areq
to identify tools in need of performance improvement. The assumption was that tools
with A80 below Areq introduced variability into the line and are one cause of large WIP
bubbles. Additionally, tool areas with predicted capacity shortfalls for future factory load
levels were prioritized. While these prioritization approaches make sense and were based
on data, the type of approach - AM, PM, or WE - to be used to improve the area was
based on gut feel.
In addition to metrics tracked for overall factory performance, the mX Steering
Committee with input from the mX Group has started tracking some additional metrics.
Those metrics include the M-Ratio and the Coefficient of Variation (CoV) of
Availability. The M-Ratio is the ratio of scheduled to unscheduled maintenance. An M-
Ratio of 9 is considered world class by Intel (Fearing, 2006). The CoV is a normalized
calculation that enables the user of the data to compare the width of various probability
distributions. The CoV of Availability calculation is shown below.
Co V _ Availability = UAvailability
l Availability
Where o7Availability is the standard deviation and pAvailability is the average of the most recent
91 days of availability data. While use of these metrics represents a move in the right
direction, namely driving desired behavior, there is a disconnect between what is desired
- zero throughput variation - and what is measured - schedule to unscheduled
maintenance or the variability of availability. These metrics implicitly assume that a
single factor drives variation.
Take the M-Ratio for example. Assume a given tool set has an observed M-Ratio of 0.5.
Intel has identified an M-Ratio of 9 as world class. Viewing the M-Ratio, even in
conjunction with availability and utilization metrics, one might assume that this tool
needs to be refurbished and maintenance procedures need to be improved. However, if
the tool is down only 1% of the time and is not a constraint tool, the odds are that
unscheduled downtime is not driving throughput variability.
The CoV of Availability has a similar problem. Assume that all tools in an area have an
aggregate CoV of Availability of 0.06. Standing alone, this level of capacity variation
may appear to be acceptable. However, the propagation of throughput variation is more a
function of the interaction between capacity variation and WIP arrival variation. A CoV
of Availability of 0.06 may be sufficient for a tool with 50% excess capacity but
completely unacceptable for a constraint tool with zero excess capacity.
One potential result of using either the M-Ratio or CoV of Availability is that
organizational improvement efforts can be misallocated. For example, Tool Z may have
a CoV of Availability of 0.08 and tool X may have a CoV of Availability of 0.06. Based
strictly on CoV of Availability, tool Z would be prioritized over tool X even though tool
Z may have 100% excess capacity while tool X has no excess capacity.
To better understand the source of throughput variation, a more balanced approach is
needed. One method is to start with a simple throughput model of wafers out of a tool as
a function of beginning on hand inventory and WIP arrivals at the tool. By doing so,
variation in WIP flow can be eliminated as a potential source of throughput variation.
5.2 Measures to Identify Throughput Variability
Throughput is a function of many different variables. Figure 12 shows the variables
involved in most manufacturing processes (Gershwin, 1994).
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Figure 12: Generic Throughput Model
As the model suggests, throughput variability is caused by four variables, WIP arrivals to
an operation, beginning on hand inventory at the operation, people capability to process
available WIP, and finally equipment capacity. The current method for understanding
throughput does not take all of these variables into account. To address the shortfalls of
the existing metrics and indicators, the following analytical technique was developed.
The technique has two goals. First, it should provide an easy to understand and interpret
measures of performance. And second, it should provide a high level indication of the
most probable source of throughput variation in an area.
The analysis approach starts with a throughput model of outs from an operation as a
function of WIP arrivals to and beginning on hand inventory at a given tool area. A
simple linear regression of aggregate arrivals to and beginning on hand inventory at
versus outs from a tool area, is modeled using the equation,
P = a + Q, + tyA, , (1)
where Pt denotes production outs in day t, Qt denotes the beginning on-hand (BOH) in
day t, At denotes arrivals in day t, and a, P, y are regression coefficients. For the
purposes of the model, we assume that all tools can process all arrivals. For example, a
select tool area may consist of 7 separate manufacturing tools and process five different
operations, all of which may have different arrival rates. (Note: This assumption is
generally acceptable at most tool types in the fab. There are areas, such as lithography,
where tool dedications violate the aggregate assumption. While this variation analysis
approach is still applicable to those areas, users should consider process flexibility or
inflexibility as a potential source of variation.) Aggregate arrival, beginning on hand, and
outs data are collected daily over a rolling 91 day period. This approach provides a "tool
view" of the production environment and accounts for two of the four variables that may
contribute to throughput variability, arrivals and beginning on hand inventory. Figure 13
provides an example of a tool area where throughput variation is entirely explained by
daily arrivals to and beginning on hand inventory at an operation. Actual throughput is
plotted on the y-axis versus predictions from the linear regression on the x-axis. (Note:
Data has been normalized for confidentiality purposes.)
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Figure 13: Arrivals/BOH Example Throughput Model 1
As mentioned above, the model is a simple least square fit of two explanatory variables,
arrivals and beginning on hand inventory. One measure of fit of a regression model is a
quantity known as R-Squared (RSq). If the model renders a high R2, then most of the
variability in production is attributable to either the variability in arrivals and/or in BOH.
Throughput Model 1, shown in Figure 13, with an RSq of 0.96, provides a clear example
of a toolset whose throughput is fully described by the model. This implies that
variability at the tool level is not a critical issue for this toolset. Additionally, the model
indicates that throughput can be predicted using the equation:
P = 0.012 +1.1lQ, +0.880A,
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|tj
oc 0.012 0.007689 1.56 0.1225
p 1.111 0.094311 11.78 <.0001
Y 0.880 0.021401 41.13 <.0001
Table 1: Throughput Model 1 Parameter Estimate Statistics
Here u, 13, and y refer to the regression coefficients shown in Equation 1.
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If a high RSq is observed, then typically the regression coefficients are significant and
can be used to understand and react to WIP dynamics at the tool. (Note: Table 1 above
provides parameter statistics for Throughput Model 1 which shows that the coefficients
are indeed significant.) For example, consider two extreme cases, Case 1 where 'y is near
tol and Case 2 where 'y is near to 0.
Case 1:
When y is near tol daily production closely follows daily arrivals. Here
the imnpact of the BOH on smoothing throughput variability is likely to be
minimal. This is an ideal case, as there should be minimal WIP and the
flow times through the operations are short.
Case 2:
When y is near to 0, daily production depends more on BOH and less on
arrivals. Here P3 acts as a smoothing parameter. The smaller P3 is, the
higher the expected WIP levels. In this case, there would be value from
increasing the production capability at the tool set as well as from
smoothing the arrivals.
If, however, a low RSq is observed, then the majority of the variability in production is
not due to arrivals or to the BOH. Therefore, one of the other two variables identified in
Figure 12, either Equipment Capacity or People Capability must be the source of
throughput variation. In this case, focusing improvement efforts on reducing tool or
people variability would be expected to be more beneficial than smoothing arrivals or
manipulating BOH levels. Figure 14 below provides an example of a where arrival and
beginning on hand variation explains some but not all throughput variation.
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Figure 14: Mixed Example Throughput Model 2
The model proposes that throughput can be predicted using the equation:
P = 0.134 + 0.285Q, + 0.634A,
The parameter estimate statistics indicate that the coefficients of the model are indeed
significant, see Table 2.
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|tj
X 0.135 0.034 3.97 0.0001
p 0.285 0.064 4.43 <.0001
7 0.635 0.069 9.25 <.0001
Table 2: Throughput Model 2 Parameter Estimate Statistics
While the fit to the model is relatively good with an RSq of 0.60, the increased dispersion
clearly points to the absence of a variable in the regression model. In this case, further
investigation is required to understand the source of the increased variation. Figure 15
below provides an example of a poor fit, where either Equipment Capacity and/or People
Capability is the source of throughput variation.
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Figure 15: Equipment/People Example Throughput Model 3
For Throughput Model 3, the model suggests that throughput can be predicted using the
equation:
P = 0.573 + 0.092Qt + 0.353A,
The parameter estimate statistics indicate that the coefficients of the model are indeed
significant, see Table 3.
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> tj
X 0.573 0.114 5.03 <.0001
P 0.092 0.041 2.23 0.0284
7 0.353 0.098 3.60 0.0005
Table 3: Throughput Model 3 Parameter Estimate Statistics
In the case of a low RSq, the regression model is not as predictive. Here, the regression
coefficients values of 3, y provide a gross indication of how much WIP is needed at the
toolset, i.e. the smaller are the coefficients the greater the WIP levels at the operation.
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While the discussion above has provided a means for interpreting the model, the question
of prioritization of improvement efforts remain. It is recommended, that, for
prioritization purposes, areas where the RSq is above 0.70, throughput variation can be
attributed mostly to arrivals at the tool and can therefore be prioritized lower than areas
with a lower RSq. For areas with an RSq less than 0.7, an additional level of detail is
required. To that end, two questions need to be answered. First, at an average level, is
there enough capacity? And second, what percentage of the total time are the area tools
down?
The first question can be answered using the A80-Areq metric. However, a clearer,
easier to communicate metric is the Capacity Ratio (Cap Ratio). The Cap Ratio is
defined as the most recent 91 day average of area capacity divided by the most recent 91
day average of area arrivals. The second question can be answered by calculating the
Downtime Ratio (DT Ratio). The DT Ratio is simply one minus daily percent available.
Areas with a large Cap Ratio and a low DT Ratio are less likely to have equipment issues
as a source of throughput variation and should have throughput models with a high RSq.
The throughput model shown in Figure 13 had DT Ratio of 0.07 and Cap Ratio of 2.75,
which corresponds neatly to the observed RSq of 0.96. This is the optimal case for an
operating area, lots of excess capacity with very little downtime. This area could be
classified as a stable operating area in that throughput exiting the area does so in a stable
predictable manner.
Areas with a large DT Ratio and Cap Ratio will tend to have a fit that falls in between
these extremes. The throughput model shown in Figure 14 has an observed RSq of 0.60
and corresponding Cap Ratio and DT Ratio of 2.1 and 0.16 respectively. This is an
example of an area where a good deal, but not all of the observed throughput variation
can be attributed to arrival variation. While the Cap Ratio indicates the presence of
plenty of excess capacity, the DT Ratio indicates that total downtime may be a
contributing factor to throughput variation.
Areas with a large DT Ratio and small Cap Ratio are likely to a poor throughput model
fit. The throughput model shown in Figure 15 has an observed DT Ratio of 0.14 and Cap
Ratio of 1. This is an example where arrivals and BOH, while significant, explain very
little in terms of throughput variation. Here the low Cap Ratio and the high DT Ratio
indicates that equipment performance is a driving factor.
Once the DT and Cap Ratios have been calculated, the M-Ratio and CoV of Availability
can be used to identify or eliminate tool performance as a source of throughput
variability. Figure 16 below contains the corresponding metrics for the three areas
described above.
DT Ratio M-Ratio COV Cap Cap Ratio
Model 1 0.07 0.63 0.08 2.76
Model 2 0.16 0.40 0.15 2.1
Model 3 0.14 0.23 0.12 1
Figure 16: Complementary Equipment Metrics
As predicted by the throughput model and confirmed by the DT and Cap Ratios, the first
throughput model is an area that does not require immediate attention of an improvement
team. The second and third models, however, could use improvements in tool
performance as evident by excessive downtime and a poor M-Ratio, see Figure 16 above.
In this case, application of AM to the second and third model areas would be most
appropriate.
5.4 Visualizing the Data
An additional tool useful in visualizing the interaction between equipment performance
and WIP dynamics is the empirical probability or frequency distribution. By plotting the
probability distribution of equipment capacity and WIP arrivals for a given area,
managers and technicians can easily understand how their area is performing.
Furthermore, the probability of failure on a daily basis can also be predicted. Figure 17
below shows the probability distribution that corresponds to the first throughput model
shown in Figure 13.
00
0
0
.ou
0.3
.25
0.2-
.15
0.1 -
.05
0
-- Total Arrivals
- - - Total Capacity
0.5 1 1.5
Wafers per Day
Figure 17: Throughput Model I Arrivals and Capacity Probability Distributions
As expected, the probability that arrivals at a given area will exceed the capacity of the
area to process those arrivals is essentially zero. This implies that throughput variation is
attributable to the variation of arrivals from upstream suppliers and outside the immediate
control of managers and technician operating this area. This is not the case for
Throughput Model 2. As shown in Figure 18 there is a non-zero probability that, on any
given day, arrivals will exceed capacity.
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Figure 18: Throughput Model 2 Arrivals and Capacity Probability Distributions
The probability plot for arrivals and capacity for Throughput Model 2 clearly displays the
interaction between capacity and arrival variation. Figure 19 displays the probability
distributions for capacity and arrivals for Throughput Model 3. With a Cap Ratio of 1,
J I
t ' t
0. 
.
Figure 19 confirms that this is a constraint tool.
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Figure 19: Throughput Model 3 Arrivals and Capacity Probability Distributions
Figure 19 highlights the critical nature of tool performance for a constraint tool. As
predicted by the throughput model, throughput variation is caused by factors other than
WIP dynamics. The DT and Cap Ratios, 0.14 and 1 respectively, indicate that tool
performance may be an issue and that more information is needed. While the CoV of
Availability is relatively high, 0.12 for a constraint tool, the M-Ratio of 0.23 indicates
that unscheduled down time may be the major source of throughput variation in this area.
Figure 20 below provides a full description, the benefits, and drawbacks of the variation
analysis indicators. The following section uses the variation analysis technique described
above to prioritize area improvement efforts to areas that increase throughput variation.
Variation Analysis Performance Indicators
Description Benefits Drawbacks
Indicates whether TPT variability This is an aggregate of all area
for a given tool is a function of manufacturing tools and all layers. Is not
Indicates the level of fit of a WIP dynamics or area done to the operation level. Can be
R-Squared regression model. performance misleading as a stand alone metric.
Indication of tool health, similar
to m-ratio but this based on total Does not give you an indication cause of
D)T Ratio 1- Daily Percent Available time downtime
Aggregate average capacity divided Indicates the amount of room Does not give you an indication of what is
Cap Ratio by aggregate average arrivals between arrivals and capacity impacting tool performance
Ratio of scheduled to unscheduled Indication of tool stability/tool Can be misleading. Need to also look at
M-Ratio downtime health. down time percentage or tool availability.
Need to look at this metric in combination
CoV of Normalized measure unlike A80 with M-Ratio and Cap Ratio. More difficult
Availability Coefficient of variability for availability or required availability, for people to understand.
Figure 20: Variation Analysis Performance Indicators
5.5 Analysis of Thin Films 2
Thin Films 2 is a two of a kind tool that processes one operation in the process flow.
(Two of a kind tool is defined as a tool type of which there are only two of in the entire
factory.) To understand the source of throughput variation in this operation, a model of
outs as a function of arrivals to and beginning on hand inventory at this tool set was
created, see Figure 21 below.
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Figure 21: Thin Films 2 Throughput Model
The fit to the model is exceptionally good with an RSq of 0.99. This indicates that
throughput variation at this operation is a function of WIP dynamics and not equipment
or people performance in the area. The equipment performance metrics, shown in Figure
22, confirms this finding
DT Ratio M-Ratio COV Cap Cap Ratio
0.09 1.7 0.15 15.8
Figure 22: Thin Films 2 Equipment Performance Metrics
To further emphasize the point, Figure 23 shows the arrival and capacity probability
distributions for this operation. Note there is a zero probability that arrivals at this
operation will exceed capacity on any given day. Because it is clear that throughput
variation at this operation is a function of arrivals to this operation, two courses of action
can be taken. First, identify the upstream tool area that is the source of variation. This
can be accomplished by generating a throughput model for each of the previous
operations successively until the tool area is found. From there, the source of throughput
variation can be identified by analyzing tool performance and directly observing work in
the area.
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Figure 23: Thin Films 2 Arrival and Capacity Probability Distributions
Second, throughput variation can be reduced by either decreasing the variation of arrivals
through active WIP management based on the indications provided by the regression
coefficients, 13 and y.
5.6 Analysis of Thin Films 3
Thin Films 3 is another two of a kind tool that is also used only in one operation in the
process flow. To understand the source of throughput variation in this operation, a model
of outs as a function of arrivals to and beginning on hand inventory at this tool set was
created, see Figure 24 below.
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Figure 24: Thin Films 3 Throughput Model
As evident by the model's poor fit, RSq is equal to 0.35, throughput variation is not
completely explained by arrival and beginning on hand variation. The Cap Ratio for
Thin Films 3 is quite large at 18.3 indicating that there is more than sufficient capacity in
the tool area to process incoming WIP. The DT Ratio, however, is rather large at 0.39.
Going a step further, the M-Ratio, at 0.33, indicates unscheduled downtime is the
potential cause of throughput variation in this area. Figure 25 provides a summary of the
equipment performance metrics.
DT Ratio M-Ratio COV Cap Cap Ratio
0.39 0.33 0.38 18.3
Figure 25: Thin Films 3 Equipment Performance Metrics
Figure 26 confirms the indications of the equipment performance metrics. As shown
below there is a non-zero probability that arrivals will exceed the area's capacity to
process those arrivals.
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Figure 26: Thin Films 3 Arrivals and Capacity Probability Distributions
This area is a prime candidate for equipment improvement efforts. Autonomous
Manufacturing would prove useful as unscheduled downtime appears to be the cause of
both the excessive DT Ratio and CoV of Availability. The next step in analysis would be
to go to the point of activity and engage the area technicians to confirm the analytical
findings.
5.7 Analysis of Etch 3
The analysis of Etch 3 will demonstrate the importance of direct observation in the
analysis process. Etch 3 consists of two tools that runs one operation in the process flow.
Figure 27 shows the throughput model for Etch 3. As evident by the model's low RSq,
0.20, throughput variation in this area is not attributable to WIP dynamics.
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Figure 27: Etch 3 Throughput Model
Etch 3 has a Cap Ratio that indicates sufficient capacity on an average basis. The
distribution of Capacity is relatively narrow which indicates minimal to zero interactions
between arrivals and capacity. The DT Ratio indicates a large percentage of downtime.
While a large percentage of downtime can be concerning, the M-Ratio indicates
equipment performance really should not be an issue in this area. Figure 28 below
summarizes the equipment performance metrics.
DT Ratio M-Ratio COV Cap Cap Ratio0.14 4.0 0.06 15.6
Figure 28: Etch 3 Equipment Performance Metrics
The probability distribution for Etch 3 clearly supports this point. Figure 29 below shows
the large amount of excess capacity in this area. Additionally, the variation of arrivals
and daily capacity do not interact. The summation of these metrics indicates that direct
observation of the area is required to understand the source of throughput variation in this
segment of the line. Direct observation of the area shows that lots are held at this
operation as a WIP or line management policy.
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Figure 29: Etch 3 Arrivals and Capacity Probability Distributions
Throughput variation in this area points to variation of another downstream operation that
requires operations to be held at Etch 3. Waste Elimination efforts could be applied to
downstream segment of the process to eliminate the non-value added waiting time
experience in this section.
5.8 Conclusions
The variation analysis approach begins by modeling outs as a function of beginning on
hand inventory and arrivals at an operation. This model acts as a first pass screen to
differentiate areas that are stable, where WIP flow is a function of arrivals and beginning
on hand inventory, from areas that are not. For areas that are not stable, i.e. fit to the
model is low, further investigation is required. The next step in the approach is to
eliminate equipment performance as a source of throughput variation. The DT Ratio and
Cap Ratio coupled with the M-Ratio and the CoV of Availability assist in ruling out or
confirming equipment performance as the most likely source of throughput variation.
Finally, a period of direct observation in the area of interest is used to confirm the
findings of the analysis and to understand the impact of people capability to do work in
the area.
This approach is applicable for first pass analysis of area performance. It can be used by
Intel in two ways. First, as a prioritization tool, this approach acts as a decision support
tool to area managers deciding on the types of operational improvements any given area
should work on. This will eliminate wasted effort improving activities that have little to
no impact on an area's future performance. Second, this approach can be used to provide
general performance feedback to areas of the factory. Areas with a high RSq can be
classified as stable with predictable work flows while areas with low RSq can be
classified as unstable with unpredictable work flows. Use of this approach will provide a
clear, easy to interpret definition of a stable tool in the factory, a goal all areas should be
working for.
Chapter 6: Observations and Recommendations
F 17 has accomplished quite a bit since beginning their lean transformation in early 2003.
They have committed to lean as a factory staff. They have formed an infrastructure to
develop training content. They have developed and delivered hundreds of hours of
training content. They have led improvement activities that have realized tangible results
in direct labor savings, decreased safety incidents, and decreased quality events. Moving
forward, F 17's biggest challenges will be focusing their organizational efforts and
engaging middle management as the sustaining engine for mX. The following section
discusses observations from the six month LFM Internship. Recommendations based on
those observations provide potential next steps for the mX implementation.
6.1 Observation 1: Fragmented Organizational Effort
Intel fabs are busy places. F17 is no exception. Standard WIP management, equipment
health, safety, and quality concerns keep all stakeholders occupied for more hours than
available on a given day. Couple this fact with various improvement initiatives and daily
work quickly becomes unmanageable.
In their current state, F17, on top of normal manufacturing requirements, is pursuing
many activities that have factory wide visibility. Ranking among those initiatives are the
ramp in production volume, the mX initiative focused on eight tools in the factory, High
Precision Maintenance focused on developing the "Perfect PM", as well as other cycle
time reduction and quality initiatives led by various groups. The proliferation of
initiatives, specifically improvement initiatives has led to the formation of teams that
compete for resources to achieve similar or identical goals.
For example, many of the GLOM's involved in mX equipment improvement efforts also
have equipment teams and/or High Precision Maintenance teams working to answer the
same question - how do we, as a team, improve equipment performance. Every team
approaches the problem in a different manner. The mX teams begin with inspection to
restore the tool to new or better condition while upskilling the work force. The HPM
teams have described an ideal state of the Perfect PM and have begun their work by
making maintenance actions easier to understand and execute. While both approaches
intend to reach the same goal - zero breakdown maintenance and minimal equipment
downtime - they take very different paths to get there. Additionally each of these teams
generally requires membership of some of the same people. This leads to the excessive
use of a very valuable resource, human capital.
To address this, it is recommended that leverage points between initiatives be identified.
For example, the Perfect PM that HPM teams are working toward meshes nicely with the
AM/PM work already developed by the mX Group, in fact the Perfect PM is also the
ideal state for mX, see Figure 30 below.
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Figure 30: Perfect PM Journey
Every GLOM at F 17 currently has an mX team focused on improving operations in their
tool areas as well as an HPM team working to define the "Perfect PM". Assuming each
area is allotting the same amount of effort to both the mX and HPM initiatives,
n
consolidating the efforts will double the available human capacity and focus the energy
of all team members on the common goal. Additionally, considerable work has been
accomplished by the mX group in the development of a means for vetting and a
mechanism for resolving equipment related improvements. Consolidating the efforts
under a single initiative will decrease the frustration associated with developing training
content and an improvement roadmap required by newer initiatives. Additionally, use of
the variation analysis tool presented in Chapter 5 can further focus organization effort by
assisting in the identification of throughput variation.
6.2 Observation 2: Continuous Improvement at All Levels
Many companies have a traditional distribution of work between management and direct
labor. Intel is no exception. In a traditional model, levels of management are involved
with improvement activities while direct labor executes the routine work of
manufacturing. Problems that occur in the organization are identified and resolved by
management. The solutions are then handed down to the frontline workforce for
implementation. The motto of this type of organization is "This is your problem and this
is how you fix it." Figure 31 (Shiba & Walden, 2001) provides a visual interpretation of
this model.
Figure 31: Traditional Distribution of Work Organizational Chart
(Note: I represents the improvement activities that management are generally
responsible for and R represents the routine work that frontline labor is
generally responsible for.)
From 1998 until 2003 this structure has worked for F 17 because the competitive
environment was unchanging. Intel's "Company Optimization System," - first to market
with new technology - was unchanging because it was designed to meet an unchanging
need of the economic environment, faster processor clock speed. Figure 32 (Shiba &
Walden, 2001) shows a simple model explaining this system.
Figure 32: Traditional Methods for Optimization
Based on their current technology roadmap, F 17 will continue to compete in the
commoditized chipset market segment in the near term. To be successful, they cannot
utilize the old company optimization system. F 17 has recognized this and is attempting
to make the change at an organizational level from the one shown in Figure 31 to the
organization shown below in Figure 33 (Shiba & Walden, 2001).
Figure 33: New Organizational Model
In this model all levels of the organization are responsible for some portion of routine as
well as improvement work. Improvement work takes place at the point of activity by the
experts in the process. Management facilitates this process by enabling solutions to be
developed and implemented. The motto of this type of organization is "What is the
problem and how can I help?" This shift in organizational models transforms the
Company Optimization System from a single function, process development for Intel, to
organizational learning. The rate of learning then becomes the source of competitive
advantage for fabs such as F 17.
The mX initiative has started this transformation; however, the current path may not lead
to sustainable change. In their book, Four Practical Revolutions in Management, Shoji
Shiba and David Walden outline four principles for managing that may assist in
improving the sustainability. These principles are:
o Practice systematic development of skills
o Treat management as a coherent system
o Focus on people and their purposes
o Integrate best practices
Based on direct observation and application of these principles, over the course of the
internship, the following recommendations are made:
o Transition the role of the mX Implementation Team
Members from driver to mentor/coach
o Leverage the existing organizational structure
o Develop a system for teaching the mX principles at
all levels of the organization.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the mX Implementation Team has been responsible for
leading mX activities in designated areas of the factory. While this has been a good
model for the early stages of content development, it will not provide the organization
with an incentive to assume future responsibility (Flinchbaugh, 2006). The current
implementation model follows the process outlined below:
o mX Group develops training content
o mX Group delivers content and leads a group
through activities
o Next Steps are developed following the completion
of activities
c mX Implementation Team Member insures Next
Steps are closed
This cycle is then repeated. The intent of this model is to teach by doing. However it has
two severe drawbacks. First, while it has led to some quantifiable successes, this model
teaches a process or series of tasks by which to resolve specific problems, i.e. excessive
breakdown maintenance, excessive direct labor requirements, etc. It does nothing to
teach frontline management or labor the manner in which to think about problems. And
second, it does not provide the members of the teams with a sense of ownership of the
process. Proof of these two points has been directly observed through interactions with
various members of mX teams. Participants continuously refer to work facilitated by the
mX group as mX activities, which are viewed by the organization as additional work and
not a way to approach existing work. By making the management, both process
engineers as well as operations managers, responsible for delivering the training and
managing the follow through an incentive to fully understand the thought process will be
provided.
The recommendation for management to lead implementation activities is often met with
the reality that these members of the organization do not have the time to execute
effectively. This is entirely true given the existing organizational structures. As
described in Chapter 3, cross functional teams (FACM, GLOMs, MOD Teams) are
gathered together to work on issues that relate to area performance, see Figure 4. As a
result of past mX activity, a parallel structure has been created in the formation of mX
tool teams, see Figure 5. The mX tool teams and the MOD Teams have very similar
attendance. By leveraging the existing organizational structure two critical things are
accomplished. First, excess meetings can be minimized. And second, those
organizations have leadership relationships that are fairly well developed. Instructing
those leaders in systems of thinking behind the structured improvement processes that
have been developed offers great potential for sustained implementation.
To support this shift of leadership responsibilities, the new responsibilities of
management should be made clear. No longer will it be the leader's responsibility to
solve the problems with the system. Rather, the leader should be responsible for
understanding the system's dynamics and teaching the rules and principles of mX
thinking at the point of activity with the people doing the work (Spear, 1999). A mental
model of this type of behavior was developed (diagramed in Figure 35 below) through
the course of the internship and tested across several improvement teams. This model
was applied to develop Plan, Do, Check, Act problem solving skills with manufacturing
technicians.
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Figure 35: Mental Model for Systematic Skill Development
The first step of the process, Step A, is to develop a deep understanding of the current as
well as the ideal state of the system being improved. For the leader, this understanding
can be developed from past experience or from direct observation of the system in
question. From this understanding, it is the leader's responsibility to ask several key
questions (Spear, 1999):
o How do you do this work?
o How do you know you are doing this work correctly?
o How do you know that the outcome is free of defects?
o What do you do if you have a problem?
Asking these questions will assist the area leader in directing the people doing the work
to self-conclusion in the gaps of the existing system. Additionally, it will highlight to the
leader the key failure modes that should be addressed in the first step of the problem
solving process.
Once high agreement on the source of the problem has been developed, a plan to resolve
the problem can be generated. Step B, provides the leader with the opportunity to ask
questions to identify the activities, connections, and flows of the current system and
clearly understand how the improvement plan addresses the shortcomings of the old
system. Additionally, the scope of the plan should be addressed at this point to ensure it
is manageable as well as in the sphere of influence of the group solving the problem.
Step B provides a key opportunity for the leader to reinforce the rules of mX.
Step C, the next interaction of the mental model, involves directly observing the
execution of the plan. As execution represents the application of knowledge, this step
presents the leader with the opportunity to understand the effectiveness of the teaching
and the points of both success and failure to be highlighted in the after action review of
the next step.
Finally, in Step D, the leader can help direct the learning of the group by ensuring the
after action review is framed in terms of activities, connections, and flows. The after
action review serves two purposes for the leader. First it provides an opportunity to
reinforce the common language through discussion of the rules and principles of mX.
Second, it provides the leader with the opportunity to understand future development
opportunities of the people in the system, i.e. person A needs to develop root cause
analysis skills, person B needs to develop process mapping skills, etc.
6.3 Future Areas of Research
While conducting the research several salient questions arise that may be a source for
future research topics in this area. First, as mentioned in section 3.2, it is unclear what
role manufacturing flexibility decisions play or can in decreasing, increasing, or
minimizing throughput variation in a semiconductor manufacturing environment.
Opinions vary greatly on this subject, but are mostly contained to qualitative, experience
based assessment of area performance. Increased flexibility carries an associated
capacity cost due to test and qualification requirements of manufacturing equipment.
Decreased flexibility carries an associated cost of potentially long queues at individual
machines while other tools of similar capability are starved. A systematic method for
determining manufacturing flexibility would prove useful to Intel because it could
minimize the loss of capacity while minimizing the resulting increase in throughput
variability.
The second area that appeared interesting from a research point of view, was the potential
benefit of flow simplification in a semiconductor factory. In the current state, products
go through approximately 400 process steps throughout the manufacturing process, often
through the same series of operations multiple times. To ease the management of this
process, all product exiting a given operation enters a single queue to be processed on one
of any number tools available for that process. This results in a huge number of flow
paths products can take to get from raw material through to Sort and E-Test. Simplified
flows may lead a decrease in the probability for error leading to more efficient WIP
management by enabling the shift of management responsibility from operational area to
manufacturing layer. This may involve some amount of dedication and therefore may not
be applicable to all areas. To this end, the potential benefits of flow simplification would
have to be weighed against the costs of decreased manufacturing flexibility.
Finally, in retrospect, it would have been useful to have a more detailed knowledge of the
methods used to diagnose, coordinate, and improve manufacturing operations. To this
point, the following course materials, while not taken, were used throughout the research
process and are recommended for individuals pursuing similar areas of research: 2.852 -
Manufacturing Systems Analysis, and 15.763 - Manufacturing System and Supply Chain
Design.
6.4 Conclusions
The implementation to date has developed some much needed momentum. However,
there are still some critical challenges ahead. First, application of this variation analysis
tool will assist managers in prioritizing the type of improvement work to be done in an
area. Second, focusing organizational effort to a single initiative will reduce
organizational confusion and increase the effectiveness of teams currently in progress.
Finally, engagement of frontline management is the key to the sustainability of the mX
effort. By transitioning implementation responsibilities to the leaders in the existing
organization and developing a system to educate and support those leaders, a unique
organizational capability can be created at F 17.
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